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Abstract— This work seeks to design decisionmaking rules
for autonomous agents to jointly influence and optimize the
behavior of teamed human decisionmakers in the presence of an
adversary. We study a situation in which computational jobs are
scheduled on servers by a collection of autonomous machines
in concert with self-interested human decisionmakers, and the
human and machine schedulers must react to an adversary’s
attack on one of the servers. We show a simple machine
scheduling policy such that if all schedulers have permission
to schedule jobs on all servers, increasing the penetration of
machine schedulers always increases the level of security in
the system, even when the machine schedulers have no explicit
coordination or communication amongst themselves. However,
we show a companion result in which simple constraints on
server availability can nullify the machine schedulers ability to
effectively influence human schedulers; here, even if machine
schedulers control an overwhelming majority of jobs, are
socially-aware, and fully coordinated amongst themselves, they
are incapable of influencing human decisionmakers to mitigate
the harm of an attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent rush of technology into society’s daily life has
promised to solve grand problems, but also may bring with
it grand new risks. New technological paradigms such as the
Internet of Things allows people to interact with their devices
in unprecedented ways, but increased means of interaction
may increase vulnerability to adversarial manipulation [1],
[2]. Increasingly, society and technology are participants
in each other’s affairs, which requires that engineers and
computer scientists must be increasingly aware of the effects
of each on the other. Autonomous decisionmakers must be
designed to interact well with human decisionmakers, and
this may look fundamentally different from how autonomous
decisionmakers typically interact with one another [3].
In response to these new challenges, game theory (the
formal study of interactive decisionmaking) has emerged as
a set of mathematical tools which promise to shed some
light on the central design tradeoffs in this space [4]–[6].
In applying game theory to these types of systems, it is
common to speak of “emergent behavior” in distributed
decisionmaking; that is, game theory studies the aggregate
behavior which emerges from the entangled decisionmaking
processes of autonomous machine agents, human users, and
strategic attackers [7]–[9].
This paper represents an initial study on a concept that
we term emergent security. That is, we seek fundamental
principles which will allow the principled design of au-
tonomous decisionmakers in sociotechnical systems; these
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autonomous agents should react to the actions of attackers
in an intelligent, strategically-aware way to mitigate the harm
of attacks.
A strategic attacker’s approach may be twofold: first, the
attacker may directly attack the system and reduce quality-of-
service [10]. Alternatively, the attacker may indirectly reduce
quality-of-service by influencing ordinary system users to en-
gage in inefficient behavior; this can include attack methods
such as manipulative “social-engineering” attacks [11], [12].
The defending autonomous agents’ approach is similarly
twofold: first, agents should be designed to directly avoid
and mitigate the effects of the attacker’s actions; second,
the autonomous agents should be designed to influence the
behavior of ordinary system users so that they avoid and
mitigate the effects of the attacker’s actions [13]–[15].
This paper asks whether and under what circumstances
heterogeneous teams of human and machine decisionmakers
can act in concert to provide security for distributed systems,
despite a lack of centralized coordination among the deci-
sionmakers. Specifically, we seek distributed decisionmaking
architectures that provide emergent security; that is, the
distributed decisionmaking rules and interaction framework
guarantee that aggregate emergent behavior in the system
responds effectively to adversarial manipulation.
We pose a model of collaborative job scheduling on
servers: there is a collection of n servers and a constant
inflow of jobs; each job requires scheduling on any of the
servers. Each job is given either to one of a collection of
“machine schedulers (which then select a server for the
job based on a pre-specified algorithm) or the job is self-
scheduled (in which case the job is assigned to a server with
minimum current service time).
We consider a situation in which an intelligent attacker,
wishing to decrease system throughput, selects a server
and directly degrades its performance (e.g., by performing
a denial-of-service attack that increases average service
time) [16]. Subsequently, the machine schedulers and self-
scheduled jobs may react to the increased service time on
the attacked server and modify their scheduling choices
accordingly. The attackers hope is to maximize the resulting
performance degradation, both directly due to increased
service times on the affected server and indirectly by manip-
ulating the human and machine scheduling policies to create
a cascade of inefficiencies affecting other servers.
In light of this model, our question is simple: can the
decision rules of the machine schedulers be designed in
such a way that system security emerges as the result of
the interactive decisionmaking of the various schedulers? We
say that a system exhibits strong emergent security if, for all
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attacks, the schedulers collectively respond optimally to the
attack. On the other hand, we say that a system exhibits weak
emergent security if, for all attacks, the performance of the
schedulers’ collective response is at least no worse than a
fixed scheduling policy. Given these definitions, our results
are threefold:
Symmetric scheduling: When every server is available to
every scheduler and the machine schedulers apply a sim-
ple locally-optimal scheduling policy, every system exhibits
strong emergent security provided that the fraction of jobs
controlled by machine schedulers exceeds some threshold
(where this threshold is strictly less than 1). Crucially,
this threshold is independent of the number of machine
schedulers.
Symmetric scheduling and linear server delay: Here, if
the n servers each have identical linear delay functions,
provided that at least 1/n of the jobs are controlled by
machine schedulers, the collective response to any attack is
optimal (i.e., the system has strong emergent security even
if only a small minority of jobs are machine-controlled).
Furthermore, every system with linear server delay functions
exhibits weak emergent security. That is, regardless of the
mass of jobs controlled by machine schedulers, we have that
for any attack, collective scheduling behavior is always at
least as good as a fixed scheduling policy that is unresponsive
to attacks.
Constrained server availability: However, the above results
need not hold in the case that each scheduler can only access
a subset of servers. In this case, even if the majority of
jobs are centrally controlled by a single machine scheduler,
the system may perform nearly as poorly as a completely
unresponsive policy. Here, though the system still exhibits
weak emergent security, the ability of the machine schedulers
to reduce system cost is severely curtailed.
Our results suggest that emergent security of heteroge-
neous human-machine teams is a valid goal and can be
attained with simple decision rules. However, designers must
take care to understand how constraints and heterogeneity
can subvert an otherwise performant system.
II. MODEL
We are given a set of n servers and a total load of n
units of jobs requiring service. Following from [17], each
individual job is taken to be infinitesimally “small,” so that
each job contributes a negligible amount to congestion. We
denote the load (or mass of scheduled jobs) at server i by
xi ≥ 0, and τi(xi) denotes the delay suffered by a job
at server i under load xi. We adopt the usual convention
that each τi(xi) is convex, nondecreasing, and continuously
differentiable, and assume that the uncongested service time
at all servers is equal, or for all i, j, τi(0) = τj(0). A service
profile is denoted x := (x1, x2, . . . , xn); we require that all
jobs are serviced so that
∑
i xi = n, which we denote by
x ∈ n∆(n)1. Our key cost metric is average service delay,
denoted
C(x) :=
n∑
i=1
xiτi(xi)
n
. (1)
A. Adversarial action
An adversary, wishing to disrupt the system and increase
system cost, selects a server (throughout this paper, we adopt
the convention that this server is numbered 1) and attacks it
with strength α > 0. The effect of this attack is to uniformly
increase service times2 at server 1 by an amount α; this
is modeled by replacing the nominal delay function τ1(x1)
with the degraded delay function τα1 (x1) := τ1(x1) +α. For
convenience, for any i ≥ 1, we write ταi (xi) = τi(xi).
Since the attackers action directly increases service times
for any job on server 1, it induces a new system cost of
Cα(x) :=
n∑
i=i
xiτ
α
i (xi)
n
= C(x) + x1α
n
. (2)
B. Heterogeneous Human-Machine Teamed Scheduling
The main goal of this paper is to understand the effects of
human-machine teaming on the security of distributed sys-
tems. To accomplish this, we consider a case in which there
are m engineered schedulers (called machine schedulers)
acting in conjunction with a population of uncoordinated
human schedulers. The system designer endows the machine
schedulers with decision rules with which they select a
scheduling profile, whereas the human schedulers select a
server merely on the basis of minimizing their own service
delay.
Machine scheduler k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is responsible for
scheduling a mass of rk jobs, with r :=
∑m
k=1 rk ≤ n. We
refer to r as the machine penetration level of the system. We
term the remaining n−r jobs selfish jobs, and we model their
“behavior by assuming that each infinitesimal job among
the selfish jobs has a human owner that schedules it with
the singular goal of minimizing its service time, given the
attacker’s action and the choices of other jobs.
Figure 1 contains a simple depiction of the model. We
allow each machine scheduler to schedule on any of the
n servers, so each machine scheduler k selects a service
profile xk := (xk1 , . . . , x
k
n) ∈ xk ∈ rk∆(n), satisfying
xki ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 x
k
i = rk. Given a collection of machine-
scheduled profiles {xk} and a selfishly-scheduled profile xs,
the aggregate load on machine i is given by xi =
∑m
k=1 x
k
i +
xsi . The aggregate scheduling profile resulting from teamed
scheduling is represented x = (xs, x1, . . . xm). Sometimes,
to highlight the dependence of a scheduling profile on the
actions of a particular machine k, we may also represent an
aggregate profile as x = (xs, xk, x−k), where x−k denotes
the scheduling by machine schedulers other than k.
1 Note that for a > 0, we write a∆(n) to denote the standard probability
simplex with each of its constraints multiplied by a, so that its vertices are
of the form (0, . . . , a . . . , 0).
2Here, we consider an additive degradation of service. Naturally, this
degradation could take other forms. We adopt this particular formulation
for simplicity, postponing the study of other formulations for future work.
Fig. 1. Depiction of teamed scheduling setup for the nominal model
descried in Section II-B and considered in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. Any of
the k machine schedulers and any of the self-schedulers are free to schedule
a job on any of the n servers.
We model the aggregate behavior resulting from the col-
lective decisionmaking of the m machine schedulers and the
selfish jobs by a concept that we term team equilibrium x¯,
or an aggregate scheduling profile satisfying
x¯k ∈ arg inf
xk∈rk∆(n)
Cα (x¯s, xk, x¯−k) (3)
and
x¯si > 0 =⇒ ταi (x¯i) ≤ ταj (x¯j) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (4)
Note that at a team equilibrium, (3) implies that each
machine scheduler is scheduling (globally) optimally (given
the choices of others), and (4) implies that each selfish job
is selecting a server with minimum delay (given the choices
of others). While equilibrium existence in arbitrary games is
not guaranteed, known results for heterogeneous congestion
games give us the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1: For any α ≥ 0, any n ≥ 2, any m ≥ 1,
and any {rk}mk=1 satisfying
∑m
k=1 r
k ≤ n, the above game
has a team equilibrium x¯.
This follows immediately from elementary equilibrium
existence results in nonatomic games [18]–[20].
C. Emergent Security
We say that a system exhibits emergent security if the
teamed agents in the system (both human and engineered)
naturally adapt to attacks in such a way that the system
performance remains near-optimal even when the system is
under attack. Since the team equilibrium concept implicitly
assumes no coordination between agents, it is a natural
means to study the emergent security arising from various
decision rules.
In this context, we distinguish between different degrees of
security by comparing the performance of a team equilibrium
against that of two benchmarks:
Optimal scheduling: Given α, we denote an optimal
scheduling policy by x∗(α) ∈ arg minx Cα(x). The ultimate
goal in the emergent security paradigm is for the performance
of team equilibria to equal that of x∗(α).
Unresponsive scheduling: Here, we compare the perfor-
mance of a team equilibrium to that of an unresponsive
baseline scheduling policy that we denote xb(α); this policy
is optimal at no-attacks when α = 0, but is unresponsive to
changes in α. That is, for all α ≥ 0, xb(α) = x∗(0). Since
this scheduling policy is constant in α, we typically denote
it simply xb.
Using these two definitions, we can now state the main
qualitative performance metric of the paper:
Definition 2.1: We say that a system exhibits strong emer-
gent security if, for all α ≥ 0, it holds that all team equilibria
are optimal. That is, if x¯(α) is a team equilibrium, we have
that for all α ≥ 0,
Cα(x¯(α)) = Cα(x∗(α)). (5)
On the other hand, we say that a system exhibits weak
emergent security if, for all α ≥ 0, it holds that all team
equilibria are no worse than unresponsive scheduling. That
is, if x¯(α) is a team equilibrium, we have that
Cα(x¯(α)) ≤ Cα (xb) . (6)
In each of our forthcoming contributions, we exhibit a
system setting and then determine which of Definition 2.1’s
properties hold.
III. CONTRIBUTIONS
A. Team scheduling exhibits emergent security for symmetric
schedulers
Our first theorem is a general result on the effectiveness
of heterogeneous human-machine teams; it establishes a
baseline guarantee that performance guarantees for such
systems are monotone nondecreasing in the penetration of
machine schedulers. Furthermore, for high-enough machine
penetration, every system exhibits strong emergent security.
Theorem 3.1: For any n ≥ 2, m ≥ 1, r ∈ [0, n],
(rk)mk=1 ∈ r∆(m) and any α ≥ 0, let x¯(α) and x¯(α) be team
equilibria with machine penetration levels r and r, where
r > r. Then it holds that
Cα (x¯(α)) ≤ Cα (x¯(α)) . (7)
Furthermore, for every collection of delay functions {τi},
there exists a machine penetration threshold r¯ < n such that
if r ≥ r¯, then the system exhibits strong emergent security.
That is, for all α ≥ 0 the resulting team equilibrium (denoted
x¯(r, α)) is a globally optimal response:
Cα (x¯(r, α)) = inf
x∈n∆(n)
Cα(x). (8)
The proof of Theorem 3.1 appears in the Appendix.
That is, Theorem 3.1 provides three things: first, when all
schedulers have access to all servers, an implication of (7)
is that heterogeneous human-machine teams are at least as
performant as self-scheduled jobs. Second, for a fixed α,
increasing the penetration level of machine schedulers can
never harm the performance of the system. Third, regardless
of the number of machine schedulers, team scheduling is
globally optimal provided that the fraction of self-scheduled
jobs is small enough. Crucially here, every system may
have a positive mass of self-scheduled jobs and still exhibit
optimal team scheduling for all attack levels α.
It is important to note that the results of Theorem 3.1
do not rely in any way on explicit coordination or commu-
nication between the various machine schedulers. The only
coordination between machine schedulers happens implicitly
through the machines’ common objective function.
B. Closed-form expressions for linear delay functions
Theorem 3.1 paints a broad picture of the benefits of
machine scheduling (even if uncoordinated), but gives little
hint as to the actual performance gains possible. In particular,
the only information given about the optimal machine pen-
etration threshold r¯ is that r¯ < n; but the question remains:
how much less than n?
Accordingly, our next theorem reports the effects of team
scheduling in closed-form for a simplified setting. Here, we
consider the case that all servers have identical linear delay
functions, or τi(xi) = xi. In this setting, it is simple to
observe that the nominal optimal scheduling policy under no
attack has xi = 1 for all i; since all delay functions are
equal, the policy which equates the delay on every server is
optimal. The following theorem characterizes the effects of
n, r and α on the efficiency of team equilibria.
Theorem 3.2: For this system, given α, it holds that
r¯ = 1− α(n− 1)
2n
≤ 1.
When r ≥ r¯, the system exhibits strong emergent security
and we have that every team equilibrium x¯ is globally
optimal, satisfying
Cα(x¯) = min
{
n
n− 1 , 1 +
α
n
− α
2(n− 1)
4n2
}
. (9)
When r ∈
(
r¯ − α(n−1)2n , r¯
)
, we have that every associated
team equilibrium x¯ strictly outperforms the fully-selfish
equilibrium and satisfies
Cα(x¯) = min
 nn− 1 , r
2 + r
(
α(n−1)
n − 2
)
+ n
n− 1
 (10)
Finally, when r ≤ 1− α(n−1)n , we have that every associated
team equilibrium x¯ is equal to a fully selfish equilibrium and
satisfies
Cα(x¯) = min
{
n
n− 1 , 1 +
α
n
}
(11)
≤ Cα (xb) = 1 + α
n
. (12)
That is, for all r ∈ [0, n], this system exhibits weak emergent
security.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 appears in the Appendix.
Several things are of note here. First, the penetration
threshold r¯ is quite low: at most, only a 1/n fraction of
jobs need to be under the control of machine schedulers
to ensure that all team equilibria are optimal. Second, no
matter how many jobs are sent to machine schedulers, every
Fig. 2. Normalized cost of a team equilibrium with n = 2, plotted as a
function of machine penetration r, for various values of α. Note that the
cost is weakly decreasing in the level of machine penetration r, and the
largest gains are made when r is relatively low compared to the total mass
of jobs in the system.
team equilibrium is guaranteed to have a relative cost less
than n/(n − 1) ≤ 2, regardless of the strength of the
attack. Compared to a baseline policy which is unresponsive
to attacks, this represents a dramatic potential reduction in
cost, since the unresponsive policy has a cost of 1 + α/n,
unbounded in α. Finally, equation (11) implies that if the ma-
chine scheduler penetration is too low, the selfish schedulers
entirely dominate the scheduling profile and the machine
schedulers have no effect. In fact, for moderate attacks when
α ≤ n/(n−1), (12) indicates that this situation is identical in
cost to the unresponsive baseline scheduling policy xb which
simply ignores attacks. Figure 2 depicts the dependence of
the normalized system cost on the machine penetration level
r for various attack levels α.
C. Loss of security due to scheduling constraints
The result of Theorem 3.1 is appealing in its simplicity:
if all schedulers (both machine and selfish) have access to
scheduling on all servers, then the optimal policy for each
machine is simply to behave as though it were the only
scheduler and schedule optimally given the choices of others.
In this section, we ask if the result would change if some
servers were inaccessible to some of the schedulers; we
show that even very simple scheduling constraints can render
Theorem 3.1s optimal scheduling policies almost entirely
ineffective.
Consider the setting of Theorem 3.2, in which there are
n ≥ 3 identical servers with delay functions τi(xi) = xi, but
now suppose that the self-scheduled traffic can only access
servers 1 and 2, and that each of the machine schedulers can
access any server numbered 2 through n (that is, machine
schedulers can access any server other than 1). As before,
let r denote the mass of jobs controlled by the machine
schedulers; to ensure that this systems optimal operating
point is identical to the system of Theorem 3.2 for each
α ≥ 0, we enforce an additional constraint that r = n − 1.
See Figure 3 for a depiction of this constrained system.
In this constrained context, our first question is this: if
the machine schedulers apply the naive optimal scheduling
policy informed by Theorem 3.1, how does this system’s se-
curity compare to the unconstrained system of Theorem 3.2?
Theorem 3.3 demonstrates that despite the fact that the
machine schedulers control the vast majority of jobs, the
new constraint completely nullifies the previous benefits of
machine scheduling.
Theorem 3.3: For n ≥ 3, in the above system, let an
attacker attack server 1 with attack strength α ≥ 0. Let x¯(α)
be a team equilibrium, and let xn(α) be an uncoordinated
self-scheduled equilibrium obtained by converting all jobs to
selfish jobs. Then we have
Cα(x¯(α)) = Cα(xn(α)) = min
{
n
n− 1 , 1 +
α
n
}
. (13)
The proof of Theorem 3.3 appears in the Appendix.
That is, in the above system, even if the machine sched-
ulers control a majority fraction of (n − 1)/n of the total
traffic, simply being unable to access a single machine can
dramatically increase the attackers ability to harm overall
system performance. In fact, for attacks with α ≤ n/(n−1),
it holds that no team equilibrium outperforms an unrespon-
sive scheduling policy, or Cα(x¯(α)) = Cα(xb), just as
in (12).
To compare (13) with system optimal, consider Figure 4;
there, the solid (blue) trace corresponds to the constrained
team scheduling in (13), and the dashed (green) trace corre-
sponds to system optimal scheduling.
Note that Theorem 3.3 holds for the case that the machine
schedulers behave in an uncoordinated manner, each attempt-
ing to optimize global performance given the choices of
others. What if, on the other hand, a machine scheduler had
a “bigger-picture view of the situation, and could schedule
its traffic in anticipation of the self-schedulers response?
To understand the effect of such socially-aware machine
scheduling, we model this as a Stackelberg equilibrium in
which a single machine scheduler selects a policy for servers
{2, . . . , n} and then the selfish schedulers select between
servers 1 and 2 on the basis of delay, reminiscent of [21].
Here, we denote the machine-scheduled policy by xm =
(xm1 , . . . , x
m
n ) ∈ (n−1)∆(n) and the selfishly-scheduled pol-
icy by xs = (xs1, . . . , x
s
n) ∈ ∆(n), and to model constrained
scheduling, we enforce that xm1 = x
s
3 = · · · = xsn = 0. For
each i, we let xi = xmi + x
s
i .
The machine schedulers select a policy to minimize the
cost function
J(xm, xs) = Cα (xm + xs) . (14)
Given the machines choice of xm, the selfish schedulers
choose between servers 1 and 2 to satisfy the Nash con-
dition (4) given in this case by
xs1 > 0 =⇒ τ1(xs1) + α ≤ τ2(xs2 + xm2 ),
xs2 > 0 =⇒ τ1(xs1) + α ≥ τ2(xs2 + xm2 ).
(15)
Given α ≥ 0, we say that a scheduling profile
(xˆm(α), xˆs(α)) is a Stackelberg equilibrium if it satisfies
xˆm(α) ∈ arg min
xm∈(n−1)∆(n)
J(xm, xs(xm)),
xˆs(α) = xs(xˆm).
(16)
Fig. 3. Depiction of constrained scheduling setup for Section III-C and
Theorems 3.3 and 3.4. The 1 unit of self-scheduled jobs can only access
servers 1 and 2, while the n−1 units of machine-scheduled jobs can access
any server numbered 2 through n.
where xs(xm) denotes that the selfish jobs have scheduled
according to (15), given the choice of xm.
The following theorem reports the optimal Stackelberg
strategy, and demonstrates that only slight security gains are
possible in this situation.
Theorem 3.4: For n ≥ 3, in the above system, let an
attacker attack server 1 with attack strength α ≥ 0. The
following scheduling policy enforces an optimal Stackelberg
equilibrium satisfying (16):
xm2 =
{
1− α(n−2)2n if α < 2nn−2
(
2−
√
2n
n−1
)
,
1
n−1 otherwise.
(17)
and for all i > 2, xmi = (n− 1− xm2 )/(n− 2). Let xˆ(α) be
an optimal Stackelberg equilibrium enforced by policy (17).
Then we have
Cα(xˆ(α)) = min
{
n
n− 1 , 1 +
α
n
− α
2(n− 2)
8n2
}
. (18)
The proof of Theorem 3.4 appears in the Appendix.
The optimal scheduling policy shown in (17) exhibits the
following threshold behavior: when α is below the threshold,
the optimal policy is to artificially increase the congestion
on server 2 in an effort to limit access by the selfish jobs.
When α increases above the threshold, the optimal policy
discontinuously decreases the jobs scheduled on server 2,
since at that point the optimal Stackelberg equilibrium simply
equals the team equilibrium from Theorem 3.3. That is, when
α is above the threshold, the costs of influencing behavior
outweigh the benefits, and it becomes optimal to simply
allow the self-routers to abandon the attacked server.
Clearly, the normalized cost in the Stackelberg case (18) is
always less than the nominal uninfluenced cost from Theo-
rem 3.3, but Figure 4 clearly illustrates that this improvement
is quite small when compared to the optimal attainable value
from (9). That is, Theorem 3.4 suggests that the inefficiency
introduced by scheduling constraints presents a fundamental
impediment to system performance, and is thus deserving of
further study.
Furthermore, note that the optimal Stackelberg strategy
can optimize for system performance only by deliberately
degrading the performance of Server 2. This is justifiable
from the standpoint of overall system performance, since the
inefficiencies caused by selfish scheduling are a direct result
Fig. 4. Normalized costs Cα(x) for uninfluenced team equilibrium (Equa-
tion (13), optimal Stackelberg equilibrium (Equation (18)), and globally-
optimal scheduling profile (Equation (9)) plotted with respect to α for
n = 3. Note that for moderate values of α, the Stackelberg equilibrium
slightly outperforms the uninfluenced equilibrium, but only by a very small
amount compared to the gains possible with global scheduling.
of too many selfish jobs selecting server 2. However, the
effect of this is that the selfish jobs experience a significantly-
degraded quality of service for a wide range of α. This can
be seen directly in the middle subplot of Figure 5; here, the
dash-dot (orange) and solid (blue) traces capture both the
load on Server 2 and the total cost experienced by selfish
jobs in Stackelberg an uninfluenced settings, respectively.
IV. CONCLUSION
The results in this paper represent an initial summary look
at several possible issues that can arise when distributed
autonomous decisionmaking architectures are integrated with
those of self-interested human agents. While certain systems
are highly receptive to mixed human-autonomous decision-
making (such as the unconstrained system of Theorems 3.1
and 3.2), in other types of system, machine scheduling is
essentially useless (in the sense that selfish scheduling would
perform just as well, as in Theorem 3.3). In such systems,
even socially-aware machine schedulers (which make de-
cisions in light of their impacts on other decisionmakers)
need not improve the situation much. As discussed following
Theorem 3.4, optimal socially-aware scheduling can even
(perhaps paradoxically) cause significant increases in the
costs experienced by the human system users. Put together,
this paper paints an optimistic picture of the possible benefits
of human-machine teams in certain circumstances – but it
also tells a cautionary tale of some potential challenges and
pitfalls of the teamed paradigm.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
The proof hinges on the fact that the problem of finding a
team equilibrium can be reduced to finding a Nash flow for
a heterogeneous price-sensitive user population in a parallel-
network routing game under the influence of marginal-cost
tolls. Accordingly, we use techniques and appeal to several
results from [22] which pertain to this problem. Given
an instance of the team equilibrium problem, construct an
instance of the Nash flow routing problem in the following
way. Model each server as a network link with delay function
τi. Create two classes of users; one (corresponding to the
selfishly scheduled jobs) with mass n− r and cost function
on server i simply as τi(xi). The second class (corresponding
to the machine-scheduled jobs) has mass r and cost function
on server i given by τi(xi) + xiτ i(xi), where τ i denotes
the first derivative of τi. That is, the machine-scheduled jobs
are modeled by unit-price-sensitive users in a transportation
network being charged marginal-cost tolls.
To see that the models are equivalent, simply note that
given a choice of server by the selfish jobs, the optimization
objective the machine schedulers can be modeled as the po-
tential function of a potential game with server cost functions
of τi(xi) + xiτ i(xi). That is, if x¯ is a team equilibrium, the
machine-scheduled jobs can be modeled as nonatomic agents
playing a game with cost functions τi(xi) + xiτ i(xi). Thus,
any team equilibrium of the scheduling problem is a Nash
flow for the corresponding routing game.
Given this, we appeal directly to Lemma 2.1 of [22] which
states (in the language of the present paper) that for any
machine penetration level r and attack level α ≥ 0, any
associated team equilibrium xt(α) satisfies
Cα(x¯(α)) ≤ Cα(xn(α)),
proving the first inequality in (7).
To see that (8) is true, note the following. Let x∗ be an
optimal scheduling profile when α = 0. Let k be the index
of a minimum-delay server under profile x∗, or
k ∈ arg min
j∈{1,...,n}
τj(x
∗
j ). (19)
Observe that at this optimal profile, if all jobs currently
scheduled on server k are “converted to self-scheduled jobs,
they will still (at least weakly) prefer server k, since by
definition, for all j ≥ 1,
τk(x
∗
k) ≤ τj(x∗j ). (20)
That is, setting r¯ =
∑
i6=k x
∗
i , there exists an optimal team
equilibrium x¯ with r = r¯ < n since the n − r¯ selfish jobs
can be considered to be selecting server k. Note that even
if k = 1, it must be true that x∗1 ≤ r¯. For the remainder
of the proof, any team equilibrium is assumed to be for a
population in which r = r¯.
As discussed in the proof of Lemma 5.2 in [22], for
this population it holds that for any nontrivial attack with
α > 0 that in any team equilibrium, selfish schedulers
will select server 1 (the attacked server) if and only if no
machine schedulers select any other server, or x¯1(α) > r¯.
However, since all delay functions (and their marginal costs)
are nondecreasing, any team equilibrium with α > 0 must
have x¯1(α) < x¯1(0) and x¯i(α) ≥ x¯i(0) for all i > 1. Due
to these monotonicity properties, since x¯(0) = x∗, we thus
have that for all α > 0, x¯1(α) ≤ r¯, meaning that no selfish
schedulers select server 1 in any team equilibrium.
To complete the proof of (8), we show that when α > 0,
in every x¯(α) it must be the case that every server has a
positive mass of machine-scheduled jobs. This is because
the mass of self-scheduled jobs is n−mini{xi(0)}, and for
all i > 1, α > 0 implies that x¯i(α) > x¯i(0). Recalling again
the previously-referenced statements from [22], if all servers
have a positive mass of machine-scheduled jobs, the team
equilibrium must satisfy (8).
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
First we show that for any machine penetration level r and
attack level α, every associated team equilibrium x¯(α) has
x¯i = x¯j for all i, j > 1. (21)
Suppose that x is an aggregate scheduling profile in which
xi > xj for some i, j > 1. Note that if any selfish jobs
are scheduled on server i, then (4) implies that x is not
a team equilibrium, since there exists a server with lower
cost (namely, server j): τj(xj) < τi(xi). Further, note that
τj(xj) < τi(xi) does not optimize the machine objective
of (3) since a small mass of jobs transferred from i to j would
decrease the system’s total cost. That is, if any machine
has scheduled on server i, it follows that x is not a team
equilibrium. Thus, for i, j > 1, every team equilibrium has
x¯i = x¯j .
For any α ≥ 0, it is straightforward to verify that the
globally optimal scheduling policy x∗ has x∗1 = max{0, 1−
α(n−1)
2n }, and the remaining jobs divided evenly among
servers 2 through n, so that for i > 1, x∗i = min{n/(n −
1), 1+ α2n}. Let the machine penetration level meet or exceed
x∗1: r ≥ 1 − α(n−1)2n . Given this r, let x be an aggregate
profile with x1 < x∗1 and the remaining jobs divided equally
among servers 2 through n. In x, some machine must be
scheduling a positive mass of jobs on a server other than
1; this machine could improve the value of its objective by
shifting some jobs to server 1 to bring x1 closer to x∗1 –
implying that x is not a team equilibrium. On the other
hand, let x′ be an aggregate profile with x′1 > x
∗
1 and the
remaining jobs divided equally among servers 2 through n.
In x′, it is straightforward to verify that τ1(x′1)+α > τ2(x
′
2),
implying that if selfish jobs are selecting 1, x′ cannot be a
team equilibrium. Further, if all of the jobs on server 1 are
machine-scheduled, some of them could be shifted to servers
2 through n to bring the total cost of the profile closer to
optimal. Thus, x′ is not a team equilibrium, and it must be
the case that when r ≥ 1− α(n−1)2n , every team equilibrium
is globally-optimal; (9) may be verified by substituting the
aforementioned values of x∗1 and x
∗
i into (2).
The proofs of the remaining statements in Theorem 3.2
follow similar logic. For (10), there are not enough machine
schedulers to ensure that x¯1 = x∗1, but there are enough to
ensure that no selfish jobs schedule on server 1. Thus, in this
intermediate case, every team equilibrium has x¯1 ∈ {0, r}
and x¯i = (n− x¯1)/(n− 1), and (10) follows algebraically.
Finally, for (11), there are so few machine-scheduled jobs
in this case that the selfish jobs are all indifferent between
all links and ensure that τ1(x¯1) + α = τi(x¯i) for all i ≥ 1,
yielding x¯1 = max{1− α(n− 1)/n, 0} and (11).
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3
Here, we may repeat the argument from the proof of
Theorem 3.2 that any team equilibrium in this case has
x¯i = x¯j for all i, j > 1. (22)
The key feature of Theorem 3.2 that allowed a small mass
of machine-scheduled jobs to enforce optimality was that
the machine-scheduled jobs could access the attacked server
and effectively displace the selfish jobs. In the present
constrained setting, this is no longer possible since machine
schedulers cannot access server 1.
Thus, the equilibrium condition of the selfish jobs guaran-
tees that for low α, in any team equilibrium x¯(α), x¯1 +α =
x¯2. Combining this with (22) ensures that x¯(α) is identical to
a fully-selfish equilibrium xn(α), and (13) may be computed
as in the third part of the proof of Theorem 3.2.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.4
Lemma 1.1: For every α ≥ 0, there exists an optimal
Stackelberg equilibrium in which
x1 + α ≥ x2. (23)
Proof: This is immediately true for α = 0, when the
unique optimal Stackelberg equilibrium has xˆi = 1 for all
i. Therefore, let α > 0 and let x be any scheduling profile
such that x1 + α < x2. If x is a Stackelberg equilibrium,
the selfish schedulers incentive constraint in (16) implies that
x2 = 0, or that x1 = 1. From here, it is simple to show that
the normalized cost of this is lower-bounded by
Cα(x) ≥ 1 + α
n
, (24)
satisfied with equality when xi = 1 for all i = 1.
We will show a machine-scheduled policy x˜m which
weakly outperforms profile x and always has x˜m1 +α ≥ x˜m2 ,
implying that the optimal Stackelberg equilibrium can always
be selected to satisfy x1 + α ≥ x2. Let x˜m2 = 1/(n − 1),
and let x˜mi = n/(n − 1) for all i > 2. Clearly, for all
α, x˜s1 = 1 cannot constitute a Nash response by the self-
scheduled jobs, as this would yield x˜1 + α > x˜2, and
selfish jobs would have a strong incentive to deviate to
server 2. Thus, it must be the case that x˜s2 > 0, which
by the Nash condition in (15) implies that x˜1 + α ≥ x˜2.
Further manipulations yield the fact that Cα(x˜) ≤ 1 + α/n.
Clearly, any optimal Stackelberg equilibrium xˆ must weakly
outperform x˜, implying that for every α ≥ 0, there exists an
optimal Stackelberg equilibrium xˆ satisfying (23).
Proof of Theorem 3.4.
An optimal Stackelberg equilibrium xˆ is a solution of the
following optimization problem:
minimize
x
f(x) =
n∑
i=1
x2i + αx1,
subject to
n∑
i=1
xi = n,
x1 + α ≥ x2,
x1 ≥ 0.
(25)
The first constraint represents flow conservation; the sec-
ond constraint is a consequence of Lemma 1.1. It can easily
be shown that the optimum must have xi > 0 for all i > 1,
leaving only the relevant nonnegativity constraint of x1 ≥ 0.
Associating KKT multipliers λ ≥ 0, µ1 ≥ 0 and µ2 ≥ 0 with
the three constraints in (25), we have first-order optimality
conditions given by
2x1 + α− λ+ µ1 + µ2 = 0, (26)
2x2 − λ− µ1 = 0, (27)
2xi − λ = 0, ∀i > 2, (28)
µ1(x2 − x1 − α) = 0, (29)
µ2x1 = 0. (30)
Note the following:
1) µ1 > 0 implies that x1 + α = x2, which (due to the
selfish jobs Nash conditions) implies that x1 ≥ 0, so
we may consider µ2 = 0.
2) x1+α > x2 implies that x1 = 0, in which case µ2 ≥ 0.
That is, without loss of generality we may assume that µ1 >
0 ⇐⇒ µ2 = 0. With that in hand, when µ1 > 0 (and
µ2 = 0), the local optimizer x∗(α) (for α ≤ 4n/(3n − 2))
satisfies
x∗1 = 1−
α(3n− 2)
4n
, (31)
x∗2 = 1 +
α(n+ 2)
4n
, (32)
x∗i = 1 +
α
2n
, ∀i > 2, (33)
and the corresponding normalized cost can be derived as
Cα(x∗(α)) = 1 + α
n
− α
2(n− 2)
8n2
. (34)
When µ1 = 0 and µ2 > 0, the resulting equilibrium
resolves to the under-influenced team equilibrium x¯(α) of
Theorem 3.3, with normalized cost satisfying that of (13).
Thus, the optimal Stackelberg equilibrium xˆ(α) has nor-
malized cost equal to that in (18). Finally, equations (26)-
(28), combined with the selfish jobs conservation constraint,
can be manipulated to show (17).
